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When Fit Fosters Favoring: The Role of Private Self-Focus
The past two decades have seen an explosion of work on the role of regulatory fit in behavioral compliance, preference formation, attitude change and persuasion (e.g., Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004; Florack & Scarabis 2006; Lee & Aaker, 2004 ). This work consistently shows that framing a persuasive message in congruence with consumers' regulatory focus enhances persuasion, and promotes compliance. Although recently studies have targeted underlying mechanisms that may explain why regulatory fit fosters persuasion (e.g., Hong & Lee, 2008; Lee & Aaker, 2004; Wang & Lee, 2006) , it remains unclear under which circumstances regulatory fit effects are likely to occur.
In social science, it is almost certainly never the case that an effect happens across all situations and for all people. Hence, it is important to ask what individual characteristics or particular circumstances alter the persuasiveness of regulatory fit and why. The present research sheds light on regulatory fit effects by focusing on a boundary condition for these effects to occur.
Departing from prior research, we propose that regulatory fit effects on persuasion are stronger for people with high private self-focus because these people are especially affected by external information that is relevant for the self (Hull et al., 2002) . Private self-focus increases the activation of self-knowledge, which facilitates the processing of information that fits with one's activated self-knowledge (i.e., regulatory focus). The resulting experience of processing fluency is subsequently expected to positively influence persuasion.
In the next section we briefly review the concepts of regulatory fit and private self-focus, followed by a discussion of how private self-focus moderates the effects of regulatory fit on persuasion. We then present four experiments showing that regulatory fit enhances compliance and persuasion because of changes in processing fluency -but only among people with high private self-focus.
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Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1997) states there are two distinct mechanisms to regulate judgments and behavior, labeled promotion and prevention focus. When people are concerned with their ideal self, they are said to adopt a promotion focus. This focus prompts an eager strategy in the pursuit of hopes, wishes, and aspirations. People with a promotion focus are especially sensitive to the presence or absence of positive outcomes. In contrast, when people are concerned with their ought self, they are said to adopt a prevention focus, which entails vigilant strategies to fulfill duties, obligations, and responsibilities. A prevention focus is concerned with the presence or absence of negative outcomes. These self-regulatory strategies are independent of each other and may coexist simultaneously. Nonetheless, people tend to have a chronic predominant orientation focus on which they rely in most situations (e.g., Higgins, 2002) . In addition, regulatory foci can be made temporarily salient by situational features (Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2000) .
Past research suggests that people in a promotion orientation are especially focused on information relating to the achievement of success, whereas those in a prevention orientation are focused on avoiding failure (Higgins & Tykocinski, 1992) . This notion bears relevance to the domain of attitude change and persuasion because messages advocating values or viewpoints can focus on either the negative outcomes that could happen by not acting upon the message or the positive outcomes that could happen by complying with the message. Emphasizing the negative outcomes that can be averted fits with a prevention oriented state whereas stressing the positive outcomes that can be achieved fits with a promotion focus. Hence, incorporating different regulatory orientation strategies may result in a better understanding of the underlying motivations of persuasion and attitude change (see Lee & Aaker, 2004) .
Furthermore, people are not only more sensitive to information that corresponds with their own orientation state, they are also more motivated (e.g., Forster, Higgins, & Idson, 1998) and perform better (e.g., Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998) when they use goal pursuit strategies that match their orientation state than when they use goal pursuit strategies that mismatch their When Fit Fosters Favoring 5 orientation state. These results are in line with the principle that Higgins (2000) has termed 'value from fit' (see also Avnet & Higgins, 2006; Higgins, 2002; 2005) . This principle holds that people experience regulatory fit when they use goal pursuit strategies that match their (current) focus orientation, which in turn increases the perceived value of their behavior. In accordance with this notion, research showed that people are more motivated by role models who fit their regulatory concerns than by role models who emphasize strategies that do not fit their orientation state (Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002) .
Of importance to the present research, Aaker and Lee (2006) distinguished two types of regulatory fit. People can experience regulatory fit (versus nonfit) when they use decision strategies that match (versus mismatch) their current focus orientation (i.e., process-based fit). In parallel, regulatory fit also can be experienced when outcomes are framed in such a way that they fit with one's regulatory focus (i.e., outcome-based fit). Outcome-based fit is of particular relevance to the current research because we are interested in the effects of message framing and individual differences in regulatory focus on persuasion and attitude change. Hence, we focus on how outcomes are framed in persuasive messages rather than on the process that may be involved in attaining these outcomes.
Previous research has indeed established that people are more persuaded when outcomes are framed so that they align with people's current regulatory focus as compared to outcomes that are not framed in alignment with people's regulatory focus (e.g., Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004, Study 2; Florack & Scarabis, 2006; Lee & Aaker, 2004) . However, we maintain that these effects of regulatory fit are a function of the individuals self-focus, which is elaborated next.
Relating regulatory fit and private self-focus
In recent studies, the effects of outcome-based fit on attitude change and persuasion have been explained by processing fluency, which is the experienced ease of processing or recalling information (e.g., Labroo & Lee, 2006; Lee & Aaker, 2004) . These studies show that information When Fit Fosters Favoring 6 that fits with one's regulatory focus is processed more easily than information that does not fit and is therefore evaluated more positively. Hence, processing fluency is thought to mediate the effects of regulatory fit on evaluations. Such results are in line with previous research demonstrating that processing ease in general engenders positive evaluations (Whittlesea, 1993; Winkielman et al., 2003) .
There are reasons to assume that private self-focus would boost the mediating role of processing fluency in the relationship between regulatory fit and persuasion in such a way that regulatory fit effects are stronger when people have high private self-focus. Before explaining this relationship in detail we first elaborate on the concept of private self-focus.
Objective self-awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) states that people have the ability to focus their attention on objects and events in the external environment or on themselves, and that people can and do switch between these domains of focus. It is generally agreed that the process of focusing on one's self has both a public and a private dimension (e.g., Fenigstein, Sheier, & Buss, 1975; Franzoi & Brewer, 1984) . Public self-focus is characterized by the awareness of oneself from the imagined perspective of others whereas private self-focus is characterized by attentiveness to one's inner states, personal history, and specific features of the self. People with high private self-focus think frequently about themselves, scrutinize their behavior, and reflect on their thoughts. Moreover, people high in private self-focus are quick to make self-descriptive statements and are sensitive to changes in their internal state (Mueller, 1982; Scheier, Carver, & Gibbons, 1979) . In contrast, people with low private self-focus are less likely to scrutinize or be sensitive to their personal motives or states.
Private self-focus can be both spurred by situational demands and is a dispositional attribute of the individual. In the literature, situational private self-focus is often referred to as private selfawareness and is oftentimes manipulated by instructing people to focus on personal thoughts and feelings (e.g., Webb et al., 1989) or by placing them in front of a small mirror that reflects only When Fit Fosters Favoring 7 their shoulders and head (e.g., Govern & Marsch, 1997) . Dispositional private self-focus, on the other hand, is often referred to as private self-consciousness and assumed to be a relatively stable trait (Fenigstein et al., 1975) . In the current paper we use the term situational private self-focus when discussing manipulated states of private self-focus (i.e., private self-awareness), whereas we use the term dispositional private self-focus to describe stable individual differences in private selffocus (i.e., private self-consciousness). When discussing both, the more general term of private selffocus will be used.
Theories on private self-focus suggest that attentiveness to the internal, personal aspect of one's self results in self-evaluation. Such self-evaluation is expected to instigate a self-regulatory process aimed at reducing discrepancies between the current state and an internal norm or standard.
Yet Hull and colleagues (Hull & Levy, 1979; Hull et al., 1988; Hull et al., 2002) have forwarded a different perspective by emphasizing the role of information processing under conditions of high private self-focus. These authors propose that private self-focus relates to the encoding of information in terms of its self-relevance. According to this theorizing, private self-focus affects behavior by enhancing sensitivity and responsiveness to those aspects of the environment that are potentially relevant to the self. High private self-focus is proposed to facilitate the processing of external information in self-relevant terms. Specifically, a state of high private self-focus enhances the processing of self-relevant stimuli by activating knowledge about the self (Geller & Shaver, 1976) .
Particularly germane to the current research, Hull et al. (2002) found that the behavior of people high in private self-focus is more influenced by external primes than is the behavior of people low in private self-focus. Hull et al. (2002; experiment 3) showed that high private selffocused participants performed better on a cognitive task after an implicit success prime but worse on the same task when given an implicit failure prime, whereas the performance of people low in When Fit Fosters Favoring 8 private self-focus was unaffected by the primes. These effects suggest that people high in private self-focus are prone to encode external information as self-relevant.
In accordance with these findings, we propose that high private self-focus renders people susceptible to external information. Yet it would not be adaptive for people to walk around open, porous, and readily influenced by any and all environmental information; hence, we argue that not all information is considered self-relevant for people high in private self-focus. Rather, we propose that people high in private self-focus will easily relate external information that fits with previously stored self-knowledge. Translated into the current research this would imply that, in contrast to low self-focused people, appeals framed in promotion terms will be readily perceived as self-relevant to high self-focused people with a promotion focus and appeals framed in prevention terms will be readily perceived as self-relevant to high self-focused people with a prevention focus. Appeals framed in congruent terms are proposed to be processed more easily because a state of private selffocus activates a well-organized self-schema (Geller & Shaver, 1976) . Therefore, we expect that people high in private self-focus (as opposed to low in private self-focus) will experience greater processing fluency when they encounter information that fits with stored or activated selfknowledge. Ease of processing is subsequently expected to positively influence attitudes, behavioral intentions, and actual behavior because people use the experience of processing fluency as a basis for judgment and decision making. Hence, we hypothesize that the effect of outcome-based regulatory fit on persuasion is moderated by private self-focus. High private self-focused people (dispositional and situational) will be more affected by information that is congruent (versus incongruent) with their regulatory focus than will people with low private self-focus. Moreover, it is expected that the interaction effect between regulatory fit and private self-focus on persuasion will be mediated by processing fluency. People with high private self-focus will experience greater processing fluency when experiencing fit than will people low in private self-focus. Ease of processing will lead to persuasion and attitude change.
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In four experiments we investigated whether people would be more persuaded when a message fit their regulatory focus orientation (dispositional and situational) compared to a situation where there was no such fit. More importantly, we examined whether the effects of regulatory fit on persuasion were stronger for people with high private self-focus (dispositional and situational) than for people with low private self-focus. In experiment 1 we demonstrated that people are more persuaded to help a charity when its message was framed in terms that were congruent with their regulatory focus than when it was framed in incongruent terms, and that this effect was more pronounced for people high as opposed to low in private self-focus. Experiment 2 extended these findings to actual behavior and showed that people donated more money to a charity when their regulatory focus matched versus mismatched the charity's appeal, especially for participants with high as opposed to low private self-focus. Experiment 3 revealed that processing fluency is the underlying mechanism that accounts for the role of private self-focus in regulatory fit effects on persuasion. People high in private self-focus processed the message that fit with their regulatory focus more easily (as measured with explicit and implicit measures of processing fluency) and therefore had a more positive attitude towards the objective of the message than did participants low in private self-focus. Experiment 4 was designed to show that consumers high in private self-focus rely on the experience of processing fluency when evaluating a persuasive message on organic food. This experiment showed that high private self-focused participants who were made to feel uncertain and doubtful about their own thoughts were unaffected by regulatory fit. However, when high private self-focused participants had no reason to question or distrust their hedonic experiences, regulatory fit showed the expected positive effect on persuasion.
The current experiments extend the literature on both persuasion and regulatory focus theory by concentrating on behavioral intentions and actual behavioral change as a consequence of regulatory fit. Moreover this work highlights the role of private self-focus as an important boundary When Fit Fosters Favoring 10 condition for regulatory fit effects. The moderating role of private self-focus is explained by the experience and subsequent use of processing fluency as a basis for evaluation and decision making.
Hence, although previous research has made tremendous progress in understanding why regulatory fit effects on persuasion occur, the present experiments fine-tune that knowledge by establishing when such effects occur. Together, both streams of research aid in delineating the scope of regulatory fit effects in influence settings.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was designed to test whether people are more persuaded by a message that fits their regulatory focus than when a message does not fit with their regulatory focus and to test the moderating role of private self-focus. It was expected that participants with an induced promotion focus would offer more aid to a charity when a message about the charity is framed in terms of gains (attaining positive outcomes) than losses (preventing negative outcomes). In contrast, participants with an induced prevention focus were expected to offer more aid to the charity when it was framed in terms of losses than gains. Moreover, we hypothesized that these effects would be stronger for participants with a dispositional high (versus low) private self-focus because these participants were expected to be highly affected by external self-relevant information (i.e., information that fits with their current orientation focus).
Design and Participants
The experiment used a 2 (regulatory focus: promotion vs. prevention) x 2 (message framing:
promotion-framed vs. prevention-framed) x 2 (private self-focus: high vs. low) between-subjects design. One hundred thirty-one college students (90 male and 41 female) with a mean age of 22 years (SD = 3.08) took part in the experiment. Participants received 6 Euros or course credit for participating.
Procedure
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Participants were told that the experiment consisted of various unrelated parts. After responding to demographic questions, their dispositional private self-focus was measured and either a promotion or prevention focus was induced by exposing them to promotion-based advertising slogans or prevention-based advertising slogans, respectively. Subsequently, participants were asked whether they would be willing to help a charity that expressed either prevention-related or promotion-related values in their message.
Independent Variables
Private self-focus. Private self-focus was measured using the Private Self-Consciousness scale originally developed by Fenigstein et al. (1975; Vleeming & Engelse, 1981) . This scale measures stable individual differences in private self-focus. Participants rated a total of 10 statements (e.g., 'I reflect on myself a lot' and 'I'm generally attentive to my inner feelings') on a five-point Likert scale (1 = extremely uncharacteristic, 5 = extremely characteristic). To obtain an index of dispositional private self-focus, we averaged the scores on the items (α = .74) and used the median (3.4) to classify participants either as high or low in private self-focus.
Regulatory focus. Situational regulatory focus was activated by exposing participants to four brand logos of different product categories (i.e., cars, clothing, facial cosmetics, and airlines). These four logos were accompanied by either promotion-based slogans (i.e., 'Its Your Goal!', 'Fits Your Ambition', 'Retains Your Youth', 'Straight to your Dreams') or prevention-based slogans (i.e., 'Your Safety is Our Priority', 'Fits your Responsibility' 'Prevents Aging', 'Smooth & Save'; for a similar procedure see Aaker & Lee, 2001; Fransen, Fennis, & Pruyn, 2007) . During exposure, participants were asked to provide their opinion on three statements regarding the brand logos and the slogans (e.g., 'the slogan is well formulated') in order to keep their attention on the brands. No time limit was given.
A pretest was conducted to test whether the slogans activated the corresponding regulatory focus. Participants (N = 36) were exposed to the advertising slogans, described above, and When Fit Fosters Favoring 12 subsequently responded to three different items, which were labeled as 'personal choices' (Pham & Avnet, 2004) . Participants were asked to choose one of two statements that anchored opposite ends of seven-point scales. The items started with 'I would prefer to…'. Participants could indicate which statement they would prefer to perform at this moment in time (e.g., 'take a trip around the world' vs. 'pay back my loans'). Participants' mean ratings were used as an index of regulatory focus ranging from 1 (emphasis on ideals) to 7 (emphasis on oughts). Hence, higher scores indicate a stronger prevention focus and lower scores indicate a stronger promotion focus. As expected, participants who were exposed to the prevention-based advertising slogans scored higher on this measure (M = 3.06, SD = 0.84), indicating a relative emphasis on oughts compared to participants who saw the promotion-based slogans (M = 2.44, SD = .34), (F(1, 34) = 8.0, p < .01).
Message framing. Participants were instructed to read the description of an existing but unfamiliar charitable organization (G.S.A.P.; General Society for African Projects) that expressed its goals either in eager terms, aimed at realizing desirable outcomes (e.g., 'Our main aim is to make sure that children can go to school so they can learn how to read and thus realize their ambition and dreams'), or in vigilant terms, aimed at avoiding failure (e.g., 'Our main aim is to make sure that children can go to school so we can prevent illiteracy and a lack of education and thus forestall unemployment'). Participants were randomly assigned to the promotion-framed or preventionframed information.
Dependent Variable
To measure compliance with the request to support the charity, participants were asked whether they would 1) like to receive more information about the charity, 2) leave their email address so they could be contacted when the charity needed help in the future and 3) be willing to help the charity by distributing flyers. Agreement with each of these requests was scored (0 = no, 1 = yes) and summed to arrive at an overall index of compliance.
Results and Discussion
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We first tested our hypothesis that participants would offer more help to a charity whose values correspond with their current orientation state and that this interaction effect would be moderated by participants' private self-focus. To do so, we conducted a 2 (regulatory focus: promotion vs. prevention) x 2 (message framing: promotion-framed vs. prevention-framed) x 2 (private self-focus: high vs. low) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) on the responses to the three questions that constituted our dependent variable. As expected, a significant multivariate interaction effect between regulatory focus and message framing was found (F (3, 121) = 4.53, p < .01). Moreover, the results showed the predicted multivariate three-way interaction among regulatory focus, message framing and private self-focus (F (3, 121) = 2.87, p < .05). Subsequently, we constructed a measure of compliance by summing participants' responses to the three questions (range 0-3). Scale reliability was satisfactory (α = .82). An analysis of variance (ANOVA) on this measure revealed a significant interaction effect between regulatory focus and message framing (F (1, 123) = 10.12, p <.01). The means showed that participants in the promotion focus condition showed more compliance when the charity was framed in promotion-related values (M = .55, SD = 1.06) than when it was framed in prevention-related values (M = .15, SD = .62). In contrast, participants in the prevention focus condition showed more compliance when it was framed in prevention-related values (M = .32, SD = .84) rather than promotion-related values (M = .06, SD = .35).
Moreover, the results yielded the predicted three-way interaction among regulatory focus, message framing and private self-focus (F(1, 123) = 5.20, p < .05), indicating that the interaction between regulatory focus and charity framing was more pronounced for participants with high private self-focus than for participants low in private self-focus 1 . In line with expectations, the two-1 For reasons of consistency and readability, median splits are reported throughout the four studies. However, please note that multiple regression analysis with private self-focus as a continuous predictor (centered), regulatory focus and message focus as dichotomous predictors (dummy-coded), and interaction terms reflecting the two-way interaction When Fit Fosters Favoring 14 way interaction between regulatory focus and message framing was significant for participants high in private self-focus (F(1, 64) = 10.20, p = .002) but failed to reach significance for participants low in private self-focus (F < 1). To probe the two-way interaction effects for high vs. low private selffocus participants, a series of simple main effect analyses were conducted. Results indicated that among participants high in private self-focus, a situationally-activated promotion focus resulted in more compliance with the promotion-framed charity message (M = .60, SD = 1.10) than with the prevention-framed charity message (M = .10, SD = 45), (F(1, 123) = 5.98, p < .05). Conversely, participants high in private self-focus with a situational prevention focus showed more compliance in response to a prevention-framed charity message (M = .83, SD = 1.11) than to a promotionframed charity message (M = .06, SD = .25), (F(1, 123) = 9.74, p < .01). In contrast, for participants with low private self-focus, fit versus nonfit between situationally activated focus orientation and message framing did not affect compliance rates (both Fs < 1, figure 1).
<<< Insert Figure 1 about here>>>
The present findings provide a first empirical demonstration of our hypothesis that private self-focus moderates the effects of outcome-based regulatory fit. High private self-focused individuals were more affected by external information that fit with their regulatory focus than were low private self-focused individuals. These results offer initial support for the notion that the focus on one's private self activates self-knowledge (i.e., one's regulatory orientation), which renders information that matches with this knowledge highly influential. The next experiment extends these findings to overt behavior, rather than behavioral intentions.
Experiment 2 between regulatory focus and charity framing, and the three-way interaction between regulatory focus, charity framing and private self-focus, yielded similar significant results (two-way interaction: ß = .49, p < .001; three-way interaction: ß = .24, p < .05).
When Fit Fosters Favoring 15
The aim of this experiment was to extend the findings of the first experiment in several ways. First, we focused on actual monetary donations as the dependent variable, rather than behavioral intentions. Second, the present experiment measured participants' trait regulatory focus rather than the state manipulation of regulatory focus that was employed in the first experiment.
This change goes toward construct validity by attempting to find converging evidence using state manipulations as well as trait assessments. Third, a private self-focus manipulation was used to establish that the previously found results also hold when private self-focus is momentarily induced.
We expected that people would donate money to a charity whose message is framed in terms that fit with their predominant regulatory focus more so than when there was no such fit. Furthermore, this effect was expected to be stronger under conditions of situational high (versus low) private selffocus.
Design and Participants
Our predictions were tested in a 2 (regulatory focus: promotion vs. prevention) x 2 (message framing: promotion-framed vs. prevention-framed) x 2 (private self-focus: high vs. low) design with regulatory focus and private self-focus as between subjects variables and message framing as a within subjects variable. Fifty-three undergraduate students (27 males and 26 females) participated in the experiment (M age = 20.94, SD age = 2.80). Participants were provided with course credit and 6
Euros.
Procedure
Upon arrival at the laboratory participants were told that the experiment consisted of several unrelated parts. They responded to demographic questions, after which their predominant regulatory focus was measured. Subsequently, private self-focus was manipulated and participants read messages about two charities. One of the charities was framed in promotion-related terms and the other in prevention-related terms. Finally, participants were asked if they would like to donate When Fit Fosters Favoring 16 money to either one or both charities. After data collection was complete, the money raised during the experiment was in fact donated to the two charities.
Independent Variables
Private self-focus. To activate situational private self-focus, we used a procedure developed and validated by Fenigstein and Levine (1984) . Participants in the high private self-focus condition were instructed to write a story using the following words (target words italicized here): 'I', 'this morning', 'park', 'candy', 'myself', 'walking', 'lamp', 'forgetting', 'me', 'throwing', 'solve', 'glove', 'case', 'shampoo', 'my', 'never', 'face', 'alarm clock', 'alone', 'bike'. In the low private self-focus condition the target words were replaced by the words 'he', 'himself', 'his', 'him', and 'together'.
Regulatory focus. We used the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (Higgins et al., 2001) , which was comprised of six promotion-items (α = .66) and five prevention items (α = .55) to establish participants predominant focus. Participants could indicate on 5-point scales how frequently specific events had occurred in their lives (ranging from 'never or seldom' to 'very often'). A procedure developed by Cesario et al. (2004) assessed whether participants were predominantly promotion-or prevention-focused. To this end, difference scores were calculated between the mean scores on the promotion items and prevention items and the resulting median score (.45) was used to classify participants as either promotion or prevention-focused.
Message framing. Participants were informed that a group of researchers had started supporting two different charities, G.S.A.P (the same organization as used in the previous experiment) and Nepal Pariwar, and that they were looking for donators. One of the charities was framed in promotion-related terms whereas the other charity was framed in prevention-related terms. The framing of the charities was randomized; half of the participants read the information about G.S.A.P. in a promotion frame (e.g., 'Our main aim is to make sure that children can go to school so they can learn how to read and thus realize their ambition and dreams') and the When Fit Fosters Favoring 17 information about Nepal Pariwar in a prevention frame (e.g., 'Our main aim is to make sure that children don't have to go to school in an unhygienic and unsafe environment'), and vice versa. Both charities exist and have the goal to stimulate educational programs in third world countries.
Dependent Variable
After reading the persuasive messages, participants were asked whether they wanted to donate any part of the money they earned from participating to one or both charities. Participants were free to donate whatever amount they wanted (if at all). The amount of money actually donated to either charities served as the dependent measure.
Results and Discussion
We tested two main hypotheses. First, that participants would donate more money to a charity that was framed in terms that corresponded to their dispositional regulatory focus than a charity that was framed in a manner that mismatched their regulatory focus. Second, that this effect would be moderated by situational private self-focus. Hence, a 2 (regulatory focus: promotion vs. prevention) x 2 (message framing: promotion-framed vs. prevention-framed) x 2 (private self-focus: high vs. low) ANCOVA with repeated measures on the second factor was conducted. The order of presentation of the charities was included as a covariate. As expected, we found an interaction effect between regulatory focus and charity framing (F(1, 48) = 6.02, p < .05). Participants with a predominant promotion focus donated 1.75 Euro (SD = 1.55) to the promotion framed charity and 1.12 Euro (SD = 1.24) to the prevention framed charity. Conversely, participants with a predominant prevention focus donated 1.52 Euro (SD = 1.64) to the charity when it was framed in prevention terms and 1.08 Euro (SD = 1.24) when it was framed in promotion terms.
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A significant three-way interaction between regulatory focus, charity framing, and private self-focus qualified the two-way interaction, in line with predictions (F(1, 48) = 6.37, p < .05) 2 .
Replicating the results of experiment 1, the two-way interaction between regulatory focus and message framing proved significant only for participants high in private self-focus (F(1, 24) = 7.95, p = .01), but not for participants low in private self-focus (F < 1). Additional simple main effect analyses confirmed that for participants high in self-focus, a predominant promotion focus elicited higher monetary donations to a promotion framed charity (M = 1.94, SD = 1.81) than to a prevention framed charity (M = .90, SD = 1.17), (F(1, 48) = 5.53, p < .05). Conversely, high private self-focus participants with a predominant prevention focus donated more money to the charity when it was framed in prevention terms (M = 1.87, SD = 1.90) rather than promotion terms (M =
.80, SD = 1.11), (F(1, 48) = 7.37, p < .01). In contrast, for low private self-focus regulatory fit did not affect charitable behavior, both Fs < 1 (figure 2).
<<< Insert Figure 2 about here>>>
The findings of this experiment corroborate and extend the results of the first experiment by showing that people actually donate more money to a charity when its message is framed in terms that are congruent (versus incongruent) with their dispositional orientation focus, and that this effect is contingent on a private self-focus state. Moreover, the results generalized to a situation in which participants' private self-focus was manipulated instead of measured. This finding provides additional evidence for the notion that the persuasive effects of regulatory fit are stronger for people high in private self-focus, either as an individual difference characteristic or situational factor. In 2 Repeated measures analysis with regulatory focus as a covariate (continuous variable), charity framing as a repeated measure factor, and private self-focus as a dummy-coded variable revealed similar results (two-way interaction F(1, 48) = 5.55, p < .05, three-way interaction F(1, 48) = 4.29, p < .05).
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addition, the predicted effects are observed regardless of whether regulatory focus was situationally manipulated (as in experiment 1) or measured as a chronic trait (as in the current experiment). The aim of Experiment 3 was to disentangle the underlying process that drives the interaction effect between regulatory fit and private self-focus by examining the role of processing fluency.
Experiment 3
The main objective of Experiment 3 was to test the underlying mechanism to explain the interaction between regulatory fit and private self-focus on persuasion and overt behavior and to rule out alternate explanations for the observed effects. We hypothesized that participants who possess a strong private self-focus process information that is relevant to their current regulatory orientation more easily because the information fits with their activated self-knowledge. We hypothesized that this process does not occur for participants who possess a weak private self-focus because their self-knowledge is activated to a lesser extent, which makes for less of an impact when incoming information matches or mismatches their regulatory orientation. Hence, it was expected that people with high private self-focus experience greater processing fluency when experiencing fit than do people low in private self-focus. This heightened ease of processing, in turn, is hypothesized to yield positive effects on persuasion (see Whittlesea, 1993; Winkielman et al., 2003) .
To rule out the possibility that the previous results may have been attributable to different levels of involvement brought about by our experimental manipulations and measures, we included a measure of involvement in the present design. Finally, we report an auxiliary study to rule out the possibility that the previous results were the product of differential mood effects or a differential reporting bias among low and high private self-focus individuals
Design and Participants
The present experiment used a 2 (regulatory fit: fit vs. nonfit) x 2 (private self-focus: high vs. low) design with ease of processing and attitudes as dependent variables. Fifty-one When Fit Fosters Favoring 20 undergraduate students (15 males, 36 females) participated for course credit or 6 Euros. Their mean age was 21 (SD = 2.36) years.
Procedure
The experimenter told the participants they would be taking part in a sequence of unrelated studies. Next and further extending the procedures used in the previous two studies, both participants' regulatory focus and private self-focus were manipulated after they had responded to demographic questions. Subsequently, participants read information about a charity (either promotion-or prevention-framed) and responded to a processing fluency measure and an attitude measure.
Independent Variables
Private self-focus. We manipulated private self-focus by asking participants to concentrate on their internal feelings and answer questions regarding themselves (Silvia, 2001) . During this task, participants saw their upper body and face (via a webcam) on one side of the computer screen, which is known to elicit a strong private self-focus (Govern & Marsch, 1997) . Participants in the low private self-focus condition were instructed to solve some simple mathematical problems. They were presented with a series of rows of numbers with missing positions and were asked to complete each of the rows (e.g., 1-3-6-?); note that this task does not involve pondering the self's inner state.
Both tasks lasted approximately the same amount of time.
Regulatory fit. We manipulated regulatory fit by presenting participants with a persuasive message that either fit or did not fit their currently activated regulatory focus. First, participants' regulatory focus was manipulated by a procedure developed by Freitas and Higgins (2002; study 2) that induces temporary states of promotion or prevention orientation. A promotion focus was induced by completing a questionnaire entitled 'Hopes and Aspirations' asking participants to describe a current wish, dream, or ambition. A prevention focus was induced by completing a questionnaire entitled 'Duty and Obligation' asking participants to describe a current duty or When Fit Fosters Favoring 21
obligation. Subsequently, as in experiments 1 and 2, participants read information about the charity G.S.A.P, which was either framed in promotion-related terms or prevention-related terms.
Participants in the fit condition were exposed to the message that was congruent with their current regulatory focus (promotion/promotion or prevention/prevention) whereas participants in the nonfit condition were exposed to the message that was incongruent with their current regulatory focus (promotion/prevention of prevention/promotion).
Dependent Variables
Participants were informed that a group of faculty researchers had decided to support a charity aimed at helping educational projects in third world countries. This survey involved asking what students think of this charity.
Ease of processing.
After reading information about the charity (either promotion-or prevention-framed), ease of processing was measured using the average of the following two items:
how difficult it was to 1) process the information and 2) understand the information (Lee & Aaker, 2004) . Agreement with the statements was indicated using a seven point scale (1 = very difficult, 7
= not difficult at all),
Attitude. Participants' attitude toward the charity was measured by seven bipolar adjective scales on five-point scales. The scales assessed how positive vs. negative, bad vs. good, useless vs.
useful, unreliable vs. reliable, unimportant vs. important, uninteresting vs. interesting, and ineffective vs. effective the charity seemed to participants. The average score on these seven items (α = .65) served as the dependent variable.
Involvement. To rule out involvement as an alternative account of the findings, we included a four-item measure using 7-point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much so). Participants were asked to rate the following items: How involved were you while reading the information about the charity?; How interested were you while reading the information about the charity?; How carefully did you read the information about the charity?; and How much attention did you pay to the When Fit Fosters Favoring 22 information about the charity? Scores on the items were averaged (α = .73) to arrive at an index of involvement.
Results and Discussion
Involvement. To assess whether participants in the fit condition were more involved in reading the charity information than participants in the nonfit condition, we conducted an ANOVA on the index of involvement with regulatory fit and private self-focus as independent variables. As anticipated, none of the effects was significant (all Fs <1 except the main effect of effect of private self-focus (F(1, 47) = 1.14, ns). Hence, involvement could not account for the observed effects in our experiments.
Ease of processing.
To test the hypothesis that regulatory fit leads to greater ease of processing, especially for participants high in private self-focus, we performed a 2 (regulatory fit: Mediation analysis. To test whether ease of processing indeed mediated the interaction effect between regulatory fit and private self-focus on attitude, we followed the procedure outlined by Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt (2005) . Regression analyses confirmed the earlier reported significant interaction effects between regulatory fit (dummy coded) and private self-focus (dummy coded) on both attitude (ß = .48, t(47) = 1.99, p = .05) and ease of processing (ß = .61, t(47) = 2.52, p < .05).
When ease of processing (the proposed mediator) and the interaction between private self-focus and ease of processing were added to the original regression model as predictors of attitude, the interaction between regulatory fit and private self-focus dropped to nonsignificance (ß = .28, t(47) = 1.15, p > .20), whereas the effect of ease of processing remained significant (ß = .52, t(47) = 2.87, p < .01). A Sobel test confirmed that the indirect effect was significant (Z = 1.89, p < .05). Hence processing fluency accounts for the impact of the interaction effect between regulatory fit and private self-focus on attitude.
The present findings demonstrate that processing fluency underlies and explains the interaction between regulatory fit and private self-focus. In particular, participants with high private self-focus processed information that fit their currently activated regulatory focus (i.e., selfknowledge) more easily than information that did not fit their regulatory focus. This processing fluency subsequently yielded more positive attitudes toward the charity. In contrast, for participants low in private self-focus, the present results suggest that a setting that induces regulatory fit (or nonfit) is inconsequential in affecting fluency experiences. Hence, these participants appeared not to experience processing fluency and consequently regulatory fit cannot affect persuasion.
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An auxiliary experiment with 62 participants was conducted to exclude the alternative explanation that the present findings were the result of differential mood effects among low and high private self-focus people. Moreover, this experiment was designed to address the possibility that low self-focus participants did experience processing fluency, similar to high self-focus participants, but simply failed to consciously report it on the explicit measure used in this experiment. Hence, in the follow-up experiment we employed an implicit rather than explicit measure to assess levels of processing fluency for high versus low self-focus individuals. Support for our contention would be found if the results on this implicit measure would parallel those on the explicit self-report measure.
For this follow-up experiment, we used the same procedure as in experiment 3 to manipulate regulatory fit. However, this time people's predominant regulatory focus was measured rather than manipulated. Participants' mood was measured using a six-item measure (using 5-point Likert statements, where 1=totally disagree, 5 = totally agree) to assess feeling negative, satisfied, angry, happy, positive, and sad. In addition, following a procedure outlined by Lee and Aaker (2004) to indirectly measure ease of processing, participants in this experiment performed a perceptual identification task. In this task, participants were supraliminally exposed to words flashed on the computer screen. Some of these words were present in the promotion-and prevention-framed messages and hence were congruent or incongruent with participants' regulatory focus. Participants then typed in the words they thought they saw. The number of correctly reproduced words served as a measure of processing fluency.
The results of this follow-up experiment showed that mood effects could not account for the previous results, since the main effects and interaction effect of regulatory fit and private self-focus were nonsignificant (Fs < 1). On the implicit measure of ease of processing, this experiment yielded the predicted interaction effect (F(1, 58) = 4.14, p < .05). Specifically, and in accordance with the previous results, participants with high private self-focus recalled and reproduced more words When Fit Fosters Favoring 25 correctly in the fit condition (M = .90, SD = .22) than in the nonfit condition (M = .67, SD = .33;
F(1, 58) = 4.52, p < .05). In contrast, participants with low private self-focus did not differ as a function of condition in word recall and reproduction (F <1). Hence, these results rule out the alternate explanation that people with low and high private self-focus experience fluency to a similar extent but only report it differently. In contrast, the present results attest to the notion that those low in private self-focus do not actually experience processing fluency, neither consciously nor unconsciously, and hence cannot use it in judgment and decision making.
This, however, leaves open one important and as yet unanswered question: If people high in private self-focus experience processing fluency and use it as a basis for judgment and decision making, then why is that so? What is the underlying psychological process that drives the impact of fit-induced processing fluency for people with high private self-focus? The next and final experiment was designed to address this issue.
Experiment 4
The previous experiments demonstrated the moderating role of private self-focus on the impact of regulatory fit on persuasion. It was found that only people high in private self-focus were affected by regulatory fit. These people experience processing fluency as a product of fit and use this feeling as a basis for attitude change and compliance with persuasive requests. People low in private self-focus, in contrast, are unaffected by regulatory fit. For people low in private self-focus, there may in fact be an 'objective' situational fit (e.g., a person's promotion focus fits with the promotion frame of the persuasive message) but this fit does not translate into an actionable mindset. That is, for these individuals, a state of fit does not affect ease of processing and, as a consequence, there are no spillover effects on persuasion and compliance.
Experiment 4 zooms-in on the psychological process that drives the mediating role of processing fluency for high self-focus people. It is clear that these people experience fit (as evidenced by higher reported levels of processing fluency) and that the attendant fluency serves as a When Fit Fosters Favoring 26 basis for judgment and decision making. Recent work on the notion of self-validation (e.g., Brinol & Petty, 2003; Brinol, Petty, & Tormala, 2004; Petty, Brinol, & Tormala, 2002) suggests why these people rely on processing fluency. Self-validation states that individuals rely on self-generated affect and cognitions to the extent that they have subjective confidence in the diagnostic value of those inner states. Particularly germane to the present work, self-validation research also suggests that subjective confidence is enhanced when people are made self-aware, that is, when they are primed with the self (rather than social or environmental cues) as a source of judgment (Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2007) . Translated to the present context, this would suggest that high self-focus people rely on processing fluency because they trust the hedonic experience of ease of processing as a diagnostic basis for judgment. For people high in private self-focus, therefore, the impact of processing fluency should be observed when there is no ground for distrust. When thought confidence is undermined, however, processing fluency should cease to affect persuasion outcomes.
This idea was explicitly tested in the present experiment.
Moreover, to extend the 'theatre of operations' in the present paper, experiment 4 moved beyond the context of charitable causes. In this experiment messages on socially responsible food production were used to further generalize our claims.
Design and Participants
The present experiment used a 2 (regulatory fit: fit vs. nonfit) x 2 (thought confidence:
absent vs. present) between-subjects design. Sixty-seven undergraduate students (42 female) with a mean age of 21 (SD = 3.57) participated. They received 6 Euros for their participation.
Procedure
Upon arrival at the laboratory participants were told that they would participate in a series of unrelated studies. Participants answered demographic questions after which they responded to the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire. Next, as we were solely interested in the effects of regulatory fit and thought confidence under conditions of high private self-focus in this experiment, all When Fit Fosters Favoring 27 participants underwent a private self-focus manipulation. To achieve high private self-focus, all participants were exposed to their upper body and face (through a webcam) during part of the experiment (Govern & Marsch, 1997) . While seeing themselves on one part of the computer screen, participants responded to some filler items. Subsequently, thought confidence was manipulated and, finally, participants reviewed the persuasive message on organic growing framed either in promotion or prevention terms.
Independent Variables
Regulatory fit. The present experiment used the same procedure as in experiment 3 to create conditions of regulatory fit vs. nonfit.
Thought confidence. The thought confidence manipulation we used in this experiment was based on a procedure developed by Petty, Brinol, and Tormala (2002) and either did or did not undermine subjective confidence in one's own thoughts. More specifically, participants were instructed to either recall and describe a personal experience that made them feel uncertain and doubtful about their own thoughts (confidence absent) or a situation in which they made use of public transportation (confidence present).
Dependent Variable
To measure attitudes toward organic growing we adopted the same measure as in Experiment 3. Hence, we used seven bipolar adjectives scales (e.g., positive vs. negative; useless vs. useful) that were rated on five-point scales (α = .75). The average score on the seven items served as the dependent variable.
Results and Discussion
We conducted a 2 (regulatory fit: fit vs. inner state, then the effects of regulatory fit disappear. Hence, it can be concluded that people high in private self-focus experience and rely on processing fluency because they are inclined to trust the hedonic experience as a basis for evaluation and judgment.
General Discussion
Our main objective with the present series of experiments was to delineate when regulatory fit results in increased persuasion and behavioral compliance and when it does not, and, additionally, what process drives these conditional effects. Across four experiments, we found support for the hypothesis that effects of outcome-based regulatory fit on persuasion and behavior are stronger for people with high private self-focus as opposed to those with low private self-focus.
More specifically, we found that participants with a promotion focus were more willing to help a When Fit Fosters Favoring 29 charity (experiment 1), donate to charity (experiment 2), had a more positive attitude towards a charity (experiment 3) and towards organic products (experiment 4) when the message was described in eager terms (aimed at attaining positive outcomes) than vigilant terms (aimed at preventing negative outcomes). The opposite was found for people with a prevention focus, who were more persuaded when the message was described in vigilant terms. Moreover, as hypothesized, we found evidence for the moderating role of private self-focus. Each of the four experiments revealed that the aforementioned regulatory fit effects were stronger for participants with high (as opposed to low) state or chronic private self-focus.
Whereas previous research has shown effects of outcome-based regulatory fit on preferences, attitudes, persuasion, and memory, the present experiments are the first to show actual (donating) behavior as a function of outcome-based regulatory fit. People donated more money to a charity that was framed in such a way that it fit their (current) regulatory focus than when the charity was framed in a nonfit manner. Additionally, similar results were obtained using a measure of dispositional regulatory focus and different manipulations of regulatory focus, which provide convergent evidence that further contributes to the generalizability of regulatory fit effects.
More importantly, the present experiments are the first to reveal the moderating role of private self-focus in regulatory fit effects. We found that the effects of regulatory fit on persuasion were stronger among people with high private self-focus compared to people with low private selffocus. The effect of private self-focus was so powerful that we observed no effect of regulatory fit on persuasion among participants in a state of low private self-focus (although aggregating over different levels of private self focus still showed the effects of fit on persuasion in line with previous research). Hence, when in a promotion orientation state, people with high private selffocus were more influenced by information that emphasized gaining positive outcomes than by information that stressed preventing negative outcomes. Conversely, people high in private selffocus with a prevention orientation state were more influenced by external information on When Fit Fosters Favoring 30 preventing negative outcomes than by information on gaining positive outcomes. People with low private self-focus were equally affected by information that either fit or did not fit their (momentary) orientation focus. This pattern was found in all four experiments, regardless of whether private self-focus was measured or manipulated. In fact, three different procedures manipulated private self-focus and all resulted in similar effects, which too adds to the reliability of our results. Moreover, the moderating role of private self-focus was observed on a host of dependent variables including helping intentions, attitudes, and actual behavior.
These results are in line with the work by Hull and colleagues (Hull & Levy, 1979; Hull et al., 1988; Hull et al., 2002) in suggesting that people high in private self-focus are highly influenced and affected by external information, which they render as self-relevant. Hull et al. (1988; 2002) argued that a state of high private self-focus activates self-knowledge, which instigates a process of self-relevant encoding. In line with this theorizing, we found that high self-focused people, as opposed to low self-focused people, were especially affected by external information that fits with their activated self-knowledge (in this case, their current orientation focus). Hence, when private self-focus is high, people are especially influenced by information that is congruent with their current orientation focus.
Moreover, the present results shed new light on the concept of private self-focus. Previous research on private self-focus mainly has emphasized the self-regulatory process instigated by a state of private self-focus. This line of reasoning states that high private self-focus activates a selfregulatory process aimed at reducing discrepancies between one's current state and an internal norm or standard. In accordance with Hull and colleagues, we showed that a state of high private selffocus is related not only to discrepancy-reducing self-regulation but also entails a qualitatively different way of information processing aimed at rendering external information self-relevant.
This viewpoint is also in line with the active-self account recently proposed by Wheeler, DeMarree, and Petty (2007) . Wheeler and colleagues (2007) argue that the active self-concept plays When Fit Fosters Favoring 31 a central role in priming effects. According to their model, moderators of general priming effects, such as private self-focus (Hull et al., 2002) , operate by more than simply affecting construct accessibility. Rather, changes in the active self-concept are key given the role of external information to guide behavior. People who are prone to process external primes as self-relevant (i.e., high self-focused individuals) are quite affected by this information. When external information is (actively) related to the self, as opposed to when it is not related to the self, it exhibits larger effects on behavioral outcomes because people use this information as a basis for evaluation and decision making. Accordingly, it is not merely awareness of oneself but rather the self-relevant information processing aspect of private self-focus that explains the effects of external information on behavior. A recent study by Wheeler et al. (2008) further argued that it is especially the selfreflective dimension, rather than the state awareness dimension, within the construct of private selffocus that accounts for the influence of external information on behavior under conditions of high private self-focus.
Yet we hypothesized in the present experiments that not all information is easily processed as self-relevant. We proposed that external information that matches one's (active) self-regulation focus is more easily processed as self-relevant than information that mismatches one's selfregulation focus. In line with results obtained by Lee and Aaker (2004) , our findings confirmed this hypothesis by showing that processing fluency is the mechanism by which this moderating role occurs. People with high private self-focus processed information that fit with their current orientation focus more easily than information that did not fit with their self-focus. Subsequently, this ease of processing led to a positive attitude towards the message's objective. Hence, processing fluency mediated the interaction effect between regulatory fit and private self-focus on attitudes.
Our data confirm the processing fluency account in regulatory fit effects (Labroo & Lee, 2006; Lee & Aaker, 2004) by showing that appeals presented in gain frames are more persuasive when the message is promotion focused whereas appeals in loss frames are more persuasive when When Fit Fosters Favoring 32 the message is prevention focused. We also add to the processing fluency account by demonstrating that high self-focused people experience stronger fluency when there is a situation of fit. In contrast, people low in private self-focus do not experience fluency as a consequence of regulatory fit. This finding was obtained using both explicit and implicit measures of fluency. Hence people low in private self-focus are unaffected by regulatory fit because they do not experience processing fluency; as a consequence, fit cannot affect persuasion and compliance (see also Petrova & Cialdini, 2005 , Study 3, who show fluency of consumption imagery effects under conditions of high private self-consciousness). Moreover, Experiment 4 demonstrated that people high in private self-focus not only experience processing fluency in a situation of regulatory fit, they also use it as a basis for decision making as long as they have no reason to doubt or distrust their own cognitions and feelings. This finding is in line with the self-validation account in persuasion as proposed by Petty, Brinol, and Tormala (2002) . They showed that persuasion effects are greater when people have confidence versus distrust in their own thoughts. As long the experience of processing fluency is not undermined, then regulatory fit has a positive effect on persuasion and compliance.
As in previous studies on regulatory fit, we were able to rule out the alternate explanations of mood and involvement. The current experiments found no effects of regulatory fit, private selffocus, or an interaction between these concepts on participants' mood states. These null findings exclude the notion that positive mood states may underlie the observed effects on persuasion.
Moreover, our findings revealed no effects of the manipulations on involvement. Hence, neither regulatory fit nor private self-focus enhances message involvement. This helps to support our notion that processing ease, rather than other mechanisms such as mood or involvement, underlies the interaction between private self-focus and regulatory fit on persuasion and compliance.
Conclusion
It is perhaps paradoxical that the message of this research is that focusing consumers on themselves can lead them to respond more positively to external persuasive attempts. One may When Fit Fosters Favoring 33 think, a priori, that people who focus their attention on the environment, rather than themselves, would be highly compliant because they are aware of and therefore may be more susceptible to external information. Instead, we found the opposite. It was high private self-focused people who responded strongly to external persuasion attempts, provided they could easily relate the persuasive message to the self. This finding contrasts with the intuitive, possibly even cynical, notion that when people focus on themselves they become egocentric and therefore disinterested in external information such as persuasive messages. The current work demonstrates that getting people to focus on themselves, in just the right circumstances, may pave the way to persuasion and behavioral compliance.
